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What is technology security and foreign disclosure (TSFD) review?

Updated 26 October 2026Checked against the SAMM: 26 October 2026

and is the set of Department of War reviews that decide whether military technology and classified information may be released to a foreign partner. The Department of War conducts the national security reviews, while the authority to authorize a transfer rests with the Departments of and Commerce. High-level release requests go to a senior steering group, and disclosure authorities decide case by case whether classified information can be disclosed.

WHO DECIDES WHETHER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CAN BE DISCLOSED Disclosure proposal classified military information for a foreign government Disclosure authority principal or designated disclosure authority Within NDP-1 limits? decided case by case yes Disclose with the originating component's consent and, if needed, the classifier's no: exception request National Disclosure Policy Committee Exceptions go to the committee Granted or denied in most cases by the committee Unilateral exceptions Secretary of War or Deputy Secretary of War only Who holds disclosure authority Disclosure authority is delegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other DoW officials. Each appoints a principal disclosure authority at headquarters and designated disclosure authorities below it. Their decisions must stay within NDP-1. fmsedge.com DoW: Department of War. FMS Edge a step · a decision · where exceptions go fmsedge.com · Current as of 5 October 2026 · SAMM C3.2.3 · C3.2.4

A principal or designated disclosure authority decides each proposal to disclose classified military information to a foreign government against the limits of the National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1). An exception beyond those limits goes to the National Disclosure Policy Committee.

Who decides whether classified information can be disclosed · Current as of 5 October 2026 · SAMM C3.2.3 · C3.2.4 · Download PNG

What is technology security and foreign disclosure?

and is the set of Department of War review processes that decide whether U.S. military technology and classified military information may be released to a foreign partner. DoDI 2040.02 requires the department to protect defense-related technology and to transfer it only in pursuit of national security and foreign policy objectives, weighing them before any commitment to disclose or release it [SAMM ]. Classified military information must be protected and shared with a foreign government only when the United States gains a clearly defined benefit, when officials designated for the purpose authorize it, and when every requirement of the disclosure policy is met [SAMM ].

Technology transfer in the simplest form is the transfer of technology from one source to another; it is agnostic of the method or manner in which the transfer takes place. seeks to securely transfer this technology from the source or origin to another authorized recipient. The United States uses various laws, regulations, and policies to protect technology. DODI 2040.02 establishes the Department of War (DoW) policy on international transfers, assigns responsibilities within the Department, and prescribes the procedures for transfers.

The Department of War is responsible for conducting national security reviews in order to provide policy and regulatory guidance on U.S. transfers or exports. These national security reviews include the complete spectrum from broad strategic reviews down to individual transactional reviews. The DoW does not have the authority to authorize transfers; that authority lies solely with the Departments of and Commerce. All transfers under and () programs undergo national security and foreign policy reviews as a matter of law and policy. The , Chapter 3, “Technology Transfer and Disclosure,” is a reference when working technology transfer and disclosure aspects of and programs or activities.

For a case that requires Congressional Notification () under Section 36(b) of the , Table C5.T22 sets out specific releasability review and approval requirements. They must be met before the notification, and the must reflect them before it is offered [SAMM ].

Within the DoW, the processes and procedures that bear on the approval to export military technology have been codified and mapped as the and review processes.

Several separate but related and (TSFD) processes support DoW release decisions. Additionally, each and many DoW agencies have internal review processes for approving the transfer of capabilities and technologies within their purview.

Under DoDI 5000.85, a program that holds classified information or Controlled Unclassified Information () and is pursuing an international cooperative program obtains a delegation of disclosure authority letter before it enters discussions with potential foreign partners. The letter, or other written authorization, comes from the DoW component's office. In preparing for an international acquisition effort, program managers should consult the and authorities, such as a principal or designated disclosure authority, on whether such information can be disclosed to other governments or international organizations.

The Deputy Secretary of War has empowered the Arms Transfer and Senior Steering Group (ATTR SSG) as the primary forum for review and adjudication of High Level Decision (HLD) TSFD release requests. The ATTR SSG has been charged with streamlining and harmonizing DoW TSFD release processes. The ATTR SSG develops, guides, and directs (consistent with U.S. policy and national security objectives) DoW-wide reform, implementation, and subsequent management of the DoW TSFD system, and ensures critical U.S. technologies are protected, and release considerations are balanced with building allied and international partner capability objectives.

Principal Disclosure Authorities () and Designated Disclosure Authorities () evaluate each proposal to disclose classified information about defense articles and services case by case, under the National Disclosure Policy (), regulations and the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information. An affirmative decision requires the consent of the or who represents the DoW Component where the information originated [SAMM ]. Where the originator has not already marked the information as releasable to the intended recipient government or international organization, the decision also requires the written consent of the official with original classification authority for it [SAMM ].

The or must also make sure that the disclosure criteria, conditions and limitations in the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information are satisfied, including that a bilateral General Security Agreement () on the mutual protection of classified information is in place. Without a , the security requirements may be set out in a program agreement, such as a for co-production or cooperative development, or in a program-specific security agreement of the kind Section C3.2.6 describes. Every authorization to disclose classified information goes on record in the National Disclosure Policy System (). In-country release of all information to a purchaser must be approved by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission [SAMM ].

References

SAMM

Public authorities

  • DoDI 5000.85: DoD Instruction 5000.85, Major Capability Acquisition, 6 August 2020, Change 1, 4 November 2021

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