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What is the National Disclosure Policy in Foreign Military Sales?

Updated 26 October 2026Checked against the SAMM: 26 October 2026

The National Disclosure Policy is the framework for approving or denying the release of classified military information to foreign governments. Disclosure authorities decide each proposal case by case under and the Department of War directive on disclosing classified military information, and the National Disclosure Policy Committee grants or denies most exceptions. When a sale would require classified information, disclosure must be approved before the system is offered or even priced.

WHO DECIDES WHETHER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CAN BE DISCLOSED Disclosure proposal classified military information for a foreign government Disclosure authority principal or designated disclosure authority Within NDP-1 limits? decided case by case yes Disclose with the originating component's consent and, if needed, the classifier's no: exception request National Disclosure Policy Committee Exceptions go to the committee Granted or denied in most cases by the committee Unilateral exceptions Secretary of War or Deputy Secretary of War only Who holds disclosure authority Disclosure authority is delegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other DoW officials. Each appoints a principal disclosure authority at headquarters and designated disclosure authorities below it. Their decisions must stay within NDP-1. fmsedge.com DoW: Department of War. FMS Edge a step · a decision · where exceptions go fmsedge.com · Current as of 5 October 2026 · SAMM C3.2.3 · C3.2.4

A principal or designated disclosure authority decides each proposal to disclose classified military information to a foreign government against the limits of the National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1). An exception beyond those limits goes to the National Disclosure Policy Committee.

Who decides whether classified information can be disclosed · Current as of 5 October 2026 · SAMM C3.2.3 · C3.2.4 · Download PNG

What is the National Disclosure Policy in Foreign Military Sales?

The National Disclosure Policy () was established as a framework for the approval or denial of the transfer of Classified Military Information () to foreign governments and international organizations. Basic authority and policy for transferring are contained in National Security Decision Memorandum () 119, which is implemented by the classified publication, National Policy and Procedures for Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, short title .

The is the interagency document that implements the core U.S. policy for the disclosure of . It promulgates U.S. policy in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, procedures for handling exceptions to policy, and other guidance governing disclosure decisions of .

The Department of War (DoW) directive on disclosing classified military information implements the National Disclosure Policy within the DoW [SAMM ].

Who decides what can be disclosed?

Disclosure decisions are made by officials holding delegated authority: a Principal Disclosure Authority at component headquarters and Designated Disclosure Authorities below it [SAMM ].

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the other DoW officials to whom the Secretary of War has delegated disclosure authority, and whose decisions must comply with , are required to appoint two kinds of disclosure official. A Principal Disclosure Authority () at component headquarters level oversees the disclosure process. A Designated Disclosure Authority () at each subordinate command and agency level oversees disclosure decisions at that level when disclosure authority has been delegated. A or must authorize any commitment to disclose or to release controlled defense-related information or technology, unless a Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter () has delegated that authority [SAMM ]. Only the Secretary of War and the Deputy Secretary of War may grant a unilateral exception to , although in most cases the National Disclosure Policy Committee () grants or denies exceptions to policy [SAMM ].

Under , the interagency National Disclosure Policy Committee () is the central authority for formulating, promulgating, administering, and monitoring national disclosure policy [SAMM ]. General members of the include the following:

  • Secretary of
  • Secretary of War (appoints Chairman)
  • Secretary of the Army
  • Secretary of the Navy
  • Secretary of the Air Force
  • Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

On a day-to-day basis, these officials are represented in decisions by designated senior officials on their staff. general members have a broad interest in all committee activities and vote on all issues that come before the committee. Other members (such as the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Energy) may vote on issues in which they have a direct interest.

What must be true before classified information is released?

Classified Military Information () may be shared with a foreign government only when the United States gains a clearly defined benefit and officials designated under the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information authorize the release. All requirements of the directive must also be met. U.S. national and DoW policy treats as a national security asset that must be protected [SAMM ].

Under the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information, the Secretary of War has delegated disclosure authority both to the Secretaries of the Military Departments () and to other DoW officials. Their decisions must comply with [SAMM ]. That directive contains the policy and guidance for implementing [SAMM ]. , by itself, does not authorize any disclosures. The Annex (classified) identifies the maximum classification level of information that can be released by country and by category of classified military information. The directive states that the will release in accordance with the Annex only if all of the following five conditions or criteria, originally outlined in 119, are met:

1. Disclosure is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

2. Disclosures, if compromised, will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the U.S. position in military technology or operational capabilities.

3. The foreign recipient of the information will afford it substantially the same degree of security protection given to it by the U.S. The intent of a foreign government to protect U.S. is established, in part, by the negotiation of general security agreements.

4. Disclosure will result in benefits to the U.S. at least equivalent to the value of the information disclosed.

5. The disclosure is limited to information necessary to accomplish the purpose for which disclosure was authorized.

If the classification of the information proposed for disclosure exceeds the country’s eligibility in the Annex, or if the policy criteria cannot be met, then the proposed disclosure must be denied unless an Exception to National Disclosure Policy () is granted [SAMM , ]. Moreover, even if the U.S. disclosure official has determined that eligibility in the Annex exists and that all policy criteria have been met, disclosures of may not be made until the affected originator’s approval has been obtained or appropriate authority to disclose has been received [SAMM , ].

and weigh each proposal to disclose classified information about defense articles and services case by case, under , regulations and the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information. An affirmative decision requires the consent of the or who speaks for the DoW Component where the information originated [SAMM ]. Where the originator has not already marked the information for disclosure to the intended recipient government or international organization, the decision also requires the written consent of the official with original classification authority for that information [SAMM ].

The or must also make sure that the criteria, conditions and limitations in the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information are satisfied, including that a bilateral General Security Agreement () on the mutual protection of classified information is in place [SAMM ]. Without a , the security requirements may be set out in a program agreement, such as a for co-production or cooperative development, or in a program-specific security agreement. For that kind of agreement, the manual points to C3.2.6. Each authorization to disclose classified information is recorded in the National Disclosure Policy System (). The in-country release of all information to a purchaser must be approved by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission [SAMM ].

In addition to making determinations on the release of , the also conducts security surveys (also called security visits) of foreign governments or international organizations. teams conduct periodic visits to foreign governments and their national industrial bases to assess capability and intent to protect U.S.-origin . The teams are usually made up of members of the Department of State and DoW. The primary areas reviewed by the teams are personnel security, , industrial security and physical security. The views of the local U.S. embassy are also sought. If the result of a survey is satisfactory, it may result in an international security agreement with the other government. A survey may also result in changes to the classified annex in concerning a country’s classification and eligibility for without engaging the process.

What is an exception to National Disclosure Policy?

When an exception to () is required, because disclosure criteria cannot be met within the existing authorized classification level, such exceptions may be granted only by the , the Secretary of War, or the Deputy Secretary of War [SAMM ]. An member, normally the cognizant for the classified information proposed for transfer, sponsors a request for an . For military weapon systems, this is normally the that has developed and produced the system.

The Secretary of War and the Deputy Secretary of War are the only officials who may grant unilateral exceptions to the [SAMM ]. All disclosure authority rests in the first instance with the head of the department or agency that originates the information, and each disclosure official confirms holding the required authority before disclosing the information in question.

Why is there no pricing before disclosure is approved?

The release of unclassified data must be authorized in advance when it would lead to the eventual disclosure of . Designated disclosure officials of the originating agencies, or the , give that authorization for any such proposal. It must also be stated explicitly, and acknowledged, that no U.S. commitment to furnish classified information or materiel is intended or implied until disclosure is approved [SAMM ].

It is the policy of the U.S. to avoid creating false impressions of its intention to provide classified military material, technology, or information. Much military hardware is unclassified; however, this same unclassified hardware, if sold, may require the release of classified information for its operation or maintenance, or for the foreign recipient training [SAMM ]. Therefore, a disclosure decision rests on the classification level of all the information that would be required for release if the system were transferred. This means that there can be no weapon-specific information, and no release of data until authority is obtained to release the highest level of classified information ultimately required for disclosure.

The same advance authorization applies to any proposal to a foreign government or international organization that grows out of initial planning by the United States, alone or jointly with the proposed recipient, and will lead to the eventual disclosure of [SAMM ]. Some classified information, such as sensitive compartmented information () and information, may require approval from outside DoW and the [SAMM ].

Disclosure planning before a Letter of Request

Under the DoW directive on disclosing classified military information, planning for possible foreign involvement should start at the beginning of the acquisition process, to facilitate decisions on disclosure in support of foreign sales or cooperative programs.

When no formal is available, a Pre- Assessment Request () serves in place of an and as grounds for the to initiate applicable and release processes. However, a cannot be used as an for any purpose other than initiating the and release processes [SAMM ].

In the preparation of the , the should compile the information described in Table C3.T2 and consult with the relevant and for releasability and technical information. When complete, the forwards the to the . Because the is an extraordinary process, a endorsement is required in each case to support initiation of the and (TSFD) release processes. The provides comments on each of the elements addressed in the in the endorsement, and forwards the and endorsement to the Joint Staff, the applicable , and the . This process forms the basis for a collaborative effort to analyze the recipient nation’s military requirements, in order to identify a capability that fulfills those requirements and initiates the DoW’s TSFD processes to meet the partner’s acquisition needs [SAMM ].

It is DoW policy to treat defense-related technology as a valuable national security resource to be protected and transferred only in pursuit of national security and foreign policy objectives [SAMM ].

References

SAMM

  • SAMM C3.2.4: Disclosure Decisions.
  • SAMM C3.1.2: Pre-Letter of Request Assessment Requests for Classified and Advanced Technology Release Decisions in Support of Security Cooperation Initiatives and Competitions.
  • SAMM C3.1.2.2
  • SAMM C3.1.1
  • SAMM C3.2.1: Policy on Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Government and International Organizations.
  • SAMM C3.2.2: Avoiding False Impressions.
  • SAMM C3.2.3: Disclosure Authorities.

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